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7Preface
Methods involving specific genetic switch mechanisms that aim to restrict the use of ge-
netic material for agricultural purposes (domesticated crops and animals) have been
described in a number of recent patent applications. These methods have been referred to
as 'Genetic Use Restriction Technologies' (GURTs). The genetic switch can be used to re-
strict either autonomous use of the germplasm itself or the expression of traits associated
with that germplasm, or the unwanted release of genes from that germplasm into the envi-
ronment.
The development and application of GURTs is primarily an attempt by private sector
agricultural breeders to increase the extent of protection on their innovations. In countries
where the use of seed varieties for commercial research or their replanting is already re-
stricted through intellectual property rights systems, GURTs provide a strategy for
increasing the enforcement of these rights through technological means. But in other situa-
tions, where for example plant variety protection is intentionally less comprehensive,
GURTs become a strategy for extending this legislated protection beyond its intended lim-
its using technological means. GURTs therefore demand that governments consider
carefully their positions on these issues.
This study examines the possible economic impacts that could arise from the deve l-
opment and commercial application of GURT constructs. A shorter but broader study, also
taking into account the expected technical developments as well as biosecurity considera-
tions and the likely impacts on farming systems, was conducted by the Wageningen
University and Research Centre at the request of the Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO) in 2001. The current report expands on the economic impacts covered in that study,
with financial support from the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and
Fisheries under its North-South research programme.
The managing director,
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse
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9Summary
Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) fulfil one of two roles as technological in-
novations for their developers: product improvements in terms of transgenic containment,
and appropriation of benefits from breeding improvements. The latter has the most rele-
vance for sectoral, national and international policy, raising issues for regulatory policy, in
particular intellectual property rights and competition issues.
There are two general applications of GURTs that can provide a means to restricting
the use of breeding improvements by farmers or other breeders. First Variety-level GURTs
(V-GURTs) could be used to produce seed that ensures that farmers cannot re-use saved
seed and that breeders cannot use seeds in their own breeding programmes. Second, Trait-
specific GURTs (T-GURTs) can ensure that value-added traits of seeds (such as induced
flowering) can only be used by farmers that have purchased the necessary inducers from
the breeding company, or its agrochemical affiliate.
GURTs are essentially an appropriation mechanism for the breeding sector, provid-
ing the opportunity to increase profits by protecting the efforts needed to develop new
varieties. The key question is how much the increased appropriation offered by GURTs
will lead to increased investment by the private sector and associated productivity im-
provements.
Hybridisation offers an example of how a technological means to increase appro-
priation has been associated with increased private sector investments in agricultural R&D.
Evidence supports the hypothesis that hybridisation of major crops has attracted more pri-
vate investment into plant breeding.
It is most likely that GURTs will only be applied in new breeds and varieties that of-
fer considerable productivity improvements to farmers, given the considerable costs of
GURT development and application. The specific crops and markets that would benefit
from increased private investment will be among those for which hybridisation has not yet
been fully successful. For example, wheat and cotton, are likely candidates. T-GURTs, in
particular, may provide the protection necessary for breeders to provide differentiated
products for the needs of different farmers and maybe also consumers.
The existence of net productivity improvements from GURTs as a result of increased
private investment depends on whether the increased investment from GURTs is additional
in the sense of expanding the overall portfolio of research activity as opposed to displacing
publicly-financed activities. Freed public R&D resources for breeding could be directed to
more marginal or orphan crops, which could be particularly important in developing coun-
tries. Realising these benefits for the agricultural sector depends on continued support for
publicly-financed agricultural R&D.
While GURTs may lead to an increase in investment for some crops, the nature of
the technology may have a negative effect on the productivity of these breeding efforts
over the longer term by resulting in more separated pools of genetic diversity.
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The most important effect that can be expected from the introduction of GURTs (es-
pecially V-GURTs as an appropriation mechanism) is an increase in the seed replacement
rate by farmers, with a transfer of benefits from farmers to seed suppliers. There is also the
potential to generate longer-term lock-in of farmers.
GURTs provide possibly a further rationale for a strengthening of the trend towards
vertical integration in the seed breeding and agrochemical sector. Whether it provides fur-
ther concern for the development of monopoly power in the biotechnology and seed sector
depends in part on the extent to which incumbent firms or new entrants can develop their
own GURT or non-GURT technologies.
The potential for GURTs to contribute to the increasing horizontal concentration is
also clear. But it remains to be established which type of competitive (or anti-competitive)
behaviour is actually emerging.
A number of possible rationales for regulation of GURT technology have been iden-
tified.
(1) IPR: Governments may need to respond proactively by deciding whether or not they
agree to any possible circumvention of their IPR legislation, particularly with respect
to farmer's privilege, as a result of the introduction of GURTs. Measures such as
compulsory licensing in patent laws might by a possible means to preventing
genepool separation for R&D purposes.
(2) Competition policy: Effective regulatory frameworks are necessary for examining
potential problems, such as excessive pricing, vertical foreclosure, bundling and ex-
clusive dealing, that could arise with GURTs. The development of such frameworks
is a particularly urgent challenge for many developing countries.
(3) Biosecurity: Governments can probably make use of the legislative framework gov-
erning the use of pesticides and veterinary medicines for biosecurity risks arising
from contamination through outcrossing of GURT constructs or components or ef-
fects of inducer compounds. However, it is not clear how governments can assess the
risks of contamination.
On the other hand, very few viable options are available for restricting or prohibiting
the use of GURTs. Using biosafety laws to ban GURTs from the market would be liable to
complaints in the WTO. Variety release procedures may offer some possibilities through
performance testing.
In summary, sufficient information is not yet available to provide governments with
a clear answer to whether prohibition, restriction or promotion of GURTs is desirable on
economic welfare grounds. A cautious interpretation of the arguments presented here indi-
cates that the potential benefits offered by GURTs in comparison to their costs and risks
are worth examining in more detail.
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1. Introduction
Methods involving specific genetic switch mechanisms that aim to restrict the use of ge-
netic material for agricultural purposes (domesticated crops and animals) have been
described in a number of recent patent applications. These methods have been referred to
as 'Genetic Use Restriction Technologies' (GURTs) 1. The genetic switch can be used to re-
strict either autonomous use of the germplasm itself or the expression of traits associated
with that germplasm, or the unwanted release of genes from that germplasm into the envi-
ronment.
The development and application of GURTs is primarily an attempt by private sector
agricultural breeders to increase the extent of industrial protection on their agricultural in-
novations. In countries where the use of seed varieties for commercial research or their
replanting is already restricted through intellectual property rights systems, GURTs pro-
vide a strategy for increasing the enforcement of these rights through technological means.
But in other situations, where for example plant variety protection is intentionally less
comprehensive, GURTs then become a strategy for extending this legislated protection be-
yond its intended limits using technological means. GURTs therefore demand that
governments consider carefully their positions on these issues.
In considering this fundamental judicial issue, it is important to examine the various
impacts that GURTs may have on agriculture, the environment and food security in rural
areas in developing countries. Positive impacts include increased investments by the pri-
vate sector in crop and animal breeding as a result of the increased ability to appropriate
the benefits arising from seed development. New varieties resulting from this investment
could contribute to higher agricultural productivity, as well as better consumer products.
Another positive aspect could be the prevention of unwanted geneflow, particularly from
genetically-modified crops, into neighbouring crop stands and animal and fish populations
and/or their wild relatives.
Potential negative impacts have been identified as well. These may require further
discussion and close attention by regulatory authorities. One consequence of GURT appli-
cation could be reduced exchange and flows of germplasm, particularly between private
and public sector in developing countries. This could further accentuate the lag in produc-
tivity growth experienced by the large numbers of farmers who are outside of the 'formal'
seed system. Secondly, the increased scale of private rights over agricultural genetic re-
sources could provide corporations in the agrochemical and biotechnology sector with the
ability to exercise and abuse to the detriment of competitors, farmers and possibly also
consumers. Such problems demand an active role for public policy, both in terms of regu-
latory measures but also in terms of decisions concerning public agricultural research
investments.
                                                
1 The technology has also been given the label, 'Terminator technology', by those particularly concerned
about its possible negative effects.
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This report reviews the economic impacts of GURT-technologies at national and in-
ternational levels. The discussion is, in general, of a qualitative nature. The next section
summarises the technical aspects of GURTs (section 2). This is then followed by a review
of the economic rationale for GURTs and an overview of the associated costs and benefits
(section 3). The report continues with a discussion of the potential impacts of GURTs on
investment in agricultural R&D and productivity (section 4). Particular attention is fo-
cussed on the examples and insights provided by hybrids, and specific considerations for
developing countries. Further sections delve into regulatory issues. It is often suggested
that GURTs will promote further horizontal concentration and vertical integration in the
breeding sector. Potential developments are therefore reviewed (section 5). This is then
followed by a review of the regulatory support and reactions possible for government (sec-
tion 6). The most important policy areas are those relating to IPR and to anti-trust and
competition systems.
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2. Technical aspects of GURTs
Two types of genetic use restrictions have been distinguished to-date: restriction of the use
of an entire variety in which the GURT 1 is embodied by inhibiting reproduction (V-
GURT); and restriction of the use of a certain trait by regulating its expression (T-GURT).
At least three general V-GURT strategies have been identified. In the first strategy, a
plant is provided with a disrupter gene that can inhibit embryo formation (described in the
application by Delta & PineLand/USDA). This disrupter remains dormant until the seed is
treated with a specific chemical, resulting in the expression of the disrupter gene in the
second generation seed produced by the treated seed. In other words, the plant resulting
from the seed produces seed which is not fertile (but can be consumed). In the second
strategy, the situation is reversed. The disrupter gene is not dormant but can be suppressed
through the application of a chemical (Zeneca application). The third strategy applies ex-
clusively to vegetatively-propagated species (e.g. root and tuber crops, ornamentals). In
this case, the variety is provided with a gene that inhibits growth. A second gene, which
can be made active through the application of a chemical, can restore this growth. With T-
GURTs, the expression of a specific trait by a transgene is regulated with the use of in-
ducible promoters.
None of the GURT strategies has yet been fully developed into practical applications,
although work appears to be progressing. The Delta & PineLand/USDA strategy still lacks
efficient control of the disrupter geners. The Zeneca concept has gone further and is now
been incorporated into transgenic tobacco plants, although not yet in a commercially-viable
way. The concept has also been developed to control the vegetative reproduction of pota-
toes, resulting in the suppression of sprouting for two years, although it is not yet clear
whether sprouting can be restored. Research on the T-GURT concept appears to have con-
centrated primarily on a strategy for removing antibiotic-resistance genes introduced as
molecular markers and is coming close to the application stage. Technically, this is not a
T-GURT because the intent is not use restriction but this does provide some indication on
the potential feasibility of the technique.
Aside from the development of the GURT concepts themselves, other obstacles to
practical or commercial application remain. One of these is the identification of effective
inducible promoters, which switch the disrupter genes on or off. This is compounded by
the fact that, in order to achieve the use restriction, such promoters should be unique and
not available in the private domain. Another obstacle is difficulty involved in transgenic
modification of many crop varieties, in particular those that would be of interest for GURT
application, such as cotton and wheat. In general, it is expected that the full development of
                                                
1 This section is based on a companion report to this one, prepared by Ingrid van der Meer and Jules Beek-
wilder of Plant Research International, and forming chapter one of the study prepared by Wageningen
University and Research Centre for the FAO on GURTs, entitled, Potential impacts of Genetic Use Restric-
tion Technologies (GURTs) on Agrobiodiversity and Agricultural Production Systems of which this study is
also a part. The interpretation though remains the responsibility of the present authors.
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the first GURT concepts may require another 10 years, and then only for those crops with
short generation times. Others will take longer.
Research on the development of GURT concepts for farm animals and aquaculture
has not advanced as far as it has for plants. The technological obstacles are greater and re-
search is complicated by more ethical issues than is the case with plants. The lag in
technology development for animals and fish has been estimated at about five years.
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3. Economic rationale for GURTs
Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) fulfil one of two roles as technological in-
novations for their developers: product improvements in terms of transgenic containment,
and appropriation of benefits from breeding improvements. The potential benefits of
GURTs, as a means of containing transgenes, is relevant primarily for biosecurity policy. It
is the application of GURTs as a benefit appropriation mechanism that has the most rele-
vance for sectoral, national and international policy, raising issues for regulatory policy, in
particular intellectual property rights and competition issues. The analysis in this report
concentrates therefore primarily on GURTs as an appropriation mechanism.
There are two general applications of GURTs that can provide a means to restricting
the use of breeding improvements by farmers or other breeders. First, Variety-level
GURTs (V-GURTs) could be used to produce seed that ensures that farmers cannot re-use
saved seed and that breeders cannot use seeds in their own breeding programmes. Second,
Trait-specific GURTs (T-GURTs) can ensure that value-added traits of seeds (such as in-
duced flowering) can only be used by farmers that have purchased the necessary inducers
from the breeding company, or its agrochemical affiliate.
Economic growth in the agricultural sector has been based on a number of factors, of
which technology development, in the form of improved varieties/breeds of cultivated
plants and domesticated animals and fish, has played an important and documented role.
Given the self-reproducible nature of these innovations, it is expected that the private sec-
tor, in particular breeding companies, would underinvest in R&D in innovations in the area
of breeding. For this reason, intellectual property protection, for example in the form of
patents or plant varietal protection (PVP) is granted in most countries and has been in-
cluded under the WTO TRIPS-Agreement (Article 27.3b).
Plant varietal protection (PVP) is the most common form of intellectual property
right available to plant breeders. This form of protection offers breeders exclusive rights
over the production and sale of the protected variety. Important allowances have been
made in the PVP legislation of many countries to allow other breeders to use a protected
variety in their breeding research (breeders' exemption) and/or to allow farmers who plant
a protected variety to re-use or possibly sell the seed they then produce themselves (farm-
ers' privilege). Standard requirements for PVP legislation have been agreed upon
internationally in the form of the UPOV (Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants) treaties of 1978 and 1991, with the latter allowing further restrictions to the breed-
ers' exemption and the farmers' privilege.
These forms of protection are intended to balance the interests of different groups
(consumers, breeders, farmers). But the policy environment has been changing as there has
been a trend towards wider rights being available to plant breeders, as reflected by these
differences between the 1991 and 1978 UPOV Acts. In recent years, a number of countries
have also allowed for patenting of plants as well as biological processes that may be inhe r-
ent parts of modern agricultural varietal production.
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In many situations, PVP systems operate with only partial enforcement due to the
large transaction costs involved. The development of GURTs has thus been partly moti-
vated by a desire by some breeding enterprises to capture a greater proportion of the
research benefits where enforcement of intellectual property systems is ineffective or too
expensive. But GURTs can also be an attempt to extend the scope of benefits appropriated
beyond that granted in IPR legislation, partly with respect to further limiting the farmer's
privilege. GURTs can thus be seen as another move in a history of developments leading to
greater appropriability of research benefits in the agricultural sector.
The various economic benefits and costs from the development and introduction of
GURTs are summarised in figure 3.1 in qualitative terms. 1 As a tool for increased appro-
priation, it is expected that GURTs will lead to increased investments by private sector
breeders, leading to productivity improvements for farmers from the availability of new
technologies in the form of varieties and breeds. These benefits for farmers, which are
really only relevant in situations where breeding research is inadequately funded from pri-
vate or public sources, would be partially offset by increased input costs from increased
seed purchases (in the case of crops). For breeders, there may be some increased costs re-
lated to negotiating access to genepools of others, where desired. The net effects of this
increased private R&D investment would presumably result in benefits for consumers in
the form of lower food prices, as well as possibly more choice in terms of differentiated
products. For governments there is the benefit in terms of a possible reduction of agricul-
tural R&D in areas in which the private sector could now play a stronger role in favour of
other neglected areas.
Benefits Costs
Farmers Increased productivity from im-
proved inputs due to increased
R&D investment
Increased input costs from seed
purchase (incl. transaction costs)
Breeders
(especially private sector)
Increased appropriation of research
benefits from new products
Increased market segmentation &
price discrimination
Increased cost for access to gene
pools of other breeders
Consumers Lower food costs
Governments Reduced investment requirements
in breeding
Fewer enforcement costs for PVP
Other regulatory support required
for GURTS
Figure 3.1 Summary of Economic Benefits and Costs from GURTS
                                                
1 The formal tools of cost-benefit analysis are not an appropriate tool of analysis for assessing the broad na-
ture of the potential impacts of GURTs but the concept of benefits versus costs provides a useful framework
for presenting these impacts across various groups.
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Governments need to assess the benefits and costs associated with GURT introduc-
tion in order to develop the policy response most appropriate for their circumstances. It can
be expected that these will vary, particularly between industrialised and developing coun-
tries but also between individual situations. The benefits and costs in figure 3.1 are
intended to provide a framework to assist policymakers in making their respective assess-
ments. It should be emphasised though that many of the identified benefits and costs
should be subjected to further analysis to be better able to provide a well-reasoned basis for
decision-making. This report aims to offer some initial qualitative expectations based on a
cursory review of existing knowledge related to this technological development, but at-
tempts to maintain a balanced perspective on the benefits and costs associated with
GURTs.
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4. Potential impacts on R&D and productivity
GURTs are essentially an appropriation mechanism for the breeding sector, providing the
opportunity to increase profits by protecting the efforts needed to develop new varieties.
The key question is how much the increased appropriation offered by GURTs will lead to
increased investment by the private sector and associated productivity improvements.
Breeders currently have two principal means to appropriate benefits: legal, through IPR
legislation and biological, through hybridisation. IPR legislation, in the form of plant
varietal protection or patents, is a relatively recent development in most countries. Systems
of IPR-protection for agricultural crops have been established in industrialised countries
during the course of the 20th century and the WTO, through the TRIPS agreement, is re-
sulting in the establishment of PVP systems in its developing-country members.
Hybridisation was also developed in the 20th century and is not yet technically possible for
all major crops, including notably wheat, soybean and cotton. Both possibilities offer ex-
amples of how increased appropriability affects investment and productivity.
Plant varietal protection
PVP systems have been subjected to some study for their economic impacts, particularly in
the UK and to some extent in the UK. Economic studies have been somewhat divided but
there appears to be a moderate consensus that plant breeders rights do not provide incen-
tive for adequate investment by the private sector in breeding activities (Eaton, 2001). This
area is still open to debate as conclusive proof is difficult to demonstrate, particularly if
one is interested not only in investment but also in increased productivity of the resulting
innovations. Studies have been able to find possible evidence of a positive effect of PVP
on investment expenditures (Butler, 1996, Perrin, Hunnings and Ihnen, 1983, Lesser,
1997). 1 Making a corresponding link with increased productivity has been more difficult,
with mixed results (see for example, Perrin, Hunnings and Ihnen 1983 on US soybeans and
Alston and Venner, 1998 on US wheat) as well as mixed interpretations of these results.
The inadequate incentives provided by PVP can be attributed to two aspects: the
scope of the protection and the effectiveness of enforcement. The scope of protection va r-
ies from country to country. This variation will be further maintained through the lack of
specific requirements on the scope of protection in Article 27.3b of the TRIPS Agreement.
Key aspects of the scope receiving attention from research have been the farmer's privilege
and the breeder's exemption (Lesser, 2000). Industrialised countries in particular have
found it worthwhile to re-examine the balance struck in PBR and there has been a trend, as
seen in the successive revisions of the UPOV convention, towards extending the scope of
                                                
1 It is quite plausible that increased investment in breeding need not accompany increased productivity, as
such investments might be oriented towards activities, such as brand marketing, or replacement of seed va-
rieties in the market with marginally improved ones, that are largely intended to profit from the 'monopoly'
powers conferred on the right holder.
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protection under PBR, in particular by restricting the farmer's privilege, which may be seen
as the greatest appropriation gap. In addition, the granting of patents on agricultural plants
in a few countries can also be seen as a step in this direction i.e. a means to increase the
scope of available protection.
While the scope of protection increases, this provides an operational means of in-
creased appropriation only if the enforcement of the property rights granted is effective.
This is limited by the costs of checking and pursuing potential violators. Where farmer's
privilege has been limited, such costs may be exceptionally high, involving field checks
and possible laboratory analysis, followed by legal proceedings. Such enforcement also re-
quires a certain level of institutional development not yet present in many countries.
Hybridisation
The limited scope of protection in some cases and the difficulty associated with effective
enforcement in cases where the scope of protection is broader provide an incentive for
breeders to seek other means of appropriating benefits. Hybridisation has offered one
means to do this for a growing number of crops, including maize, sorghum and rice. Hy-
bridisation offers an example of how a technological means to increase appropriation has
been associated with increased private sector investments in agricultural R&D. While the
parallel is not exact, the case of hybridisation, also a form of biological appropriation, is
the closest real-world example of a technological development that comes close to GURTs.
It can be expected that GURTs, by increasing the appropriability of research benefits
by breeders, will provide an incentive for them to increase investments in R&D. Limited
evidence from the US supports the hypothesis that hybridisation of major crops has, by in-
creasing the appropriability of research investments, attracted more private investment into
plant breeding (Srinivasan and Thirtle, 2000). Using the ratio of breeding investments to
seed sales as an indicator of investment, table 4.1 shows that for the hybrid crops, maize
and sorghum, private plant breeding has accounted for more than 10% of seed sales in the
US while the ratios for three non-hybrid crops are 5% or lower (Fuglie et al., 1996).
It would be helpful though to know the differences in public investment between
these crops. Appropriability is seen from the higher percentage of seed purchased for the
hybrid versus the non-hybrid crops. Differences in the growth in seed prices show more
variation among the non-hybrid crops, wheat, soybean and cotton, but are on average lower
than for the hybrid crops. This difference also supports the increased appropriability argu-
ment. As if to reinforce this, there is no marked difference in the annual growth in crop
yields between hybrids and non-hybrids. This can be interpreted as an indication that the
private investment is as equally productive as public investments, although the higher
variation among the productivity increases for non-hybrid crops may indicate that other
crop-specific factors are equally, or more, important.
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Table 4.1 Seed Sales, Private Plant Breeding and Trends in Seed Prices and Yields of Major Field Crops
in the US (1975-1992)
Crop Seed Private Ratio Seed Share of Growth Annual
sales plant private cost seed in seed growth
breeding breeding purchased price in crop
to sales yields
USD million USD million % USD/acre % %/yr %/yr
(1989) (1989)
Hybrid seeds
- Maize 1,031 112.9 11 21.09 95 4.75 1.33
- Sorghum 90 12.6 14 5.13 95 5.08 1.54
Non-hybrid seed
- Wheat 256 13.5 5 8.92 40 0.97 1.13
- Soybean 610 24.9 4 12.03 73 1.92 1.23
- Cotton 108 4.6 2 14.93 74 4.46 2.23
Source: Reproduced from Fuglie et al. (1996); Ratios of private breeding to sales are authors' own calcula-
tions.
Potential productivity improvements and public R&D
It is most likely that GURTs will only be applied in new breeds and varieties that offer
considerable productivity improvements to farmers. This is not least because the costs of
GURT development and application appear to be considerable, taking into account the
need to back-cross from original to elite lines as well as the research necessary for the se-
lection of inducers and compounds. Such productivity improvements may be in the offing.
Some of the latest improvements witnessed in GMO crops give reason to expect that the
rapid advances being made in this area will lead to yet further agronomic improvements
that go beyond the rate of increase seen in conventional breeding efforts. For example,
productivity increases of 10 to 25% in crops such as wheat and rice have been proposed as
realistic expectations with the application of biotechnology (James and Krattiger, 1999).
From a simple marketing perspective, farmers are more likely to increase their expendi-
tures on seeds, the purpose of increased appropriation, if these offer simultaneously better
performance.
T-GURTs, in particular, may provide the protection necessary for breeders to provide
differentiated products for the needs of different farmers and maybe also consumers. A
given variety could be specifically adapted to different growing conditions, for example,
managed by the use of a trigger, for example, a chemical inducer, as in the case of trigger-
ing flowering or pathogen resistance. If the inducer is a proprietary product, then the
technology has a built-in genetic use restriction. It is important to emphasise that the trait-
specific benefit would probably be achievable without the use restriction, but the latter
might provide sufficient incentive for the development and commercialisation off the in-
novation. Triggered control of trait-specific innovations could then be a component of
more productive precision farming or the production of differentiated products, meeting
the needs of either farmers or consumers.
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Despite this likely bundling of GURTs with improved varieties, the existence of net
productivity improvements from GURTs as a result of increased private investment de-
pends though on the nature of current investment, both public and private, in those crops
concerned. GURTs are by themselves an appropriation tool. By enabling increased appro-
priation of benefits, GURTs may lead to productivity benefits for crops in which current
investment in breeding is insufficient. This is more likely the case in developing countries
than in industrialised countries, as the latter generally have public breeding programmes
with relatively better resources. Such greater investment should be welcomed for its effects
on agricultural productivity with benefits for farmers and consumers alike.
Whether the increased investment from GURTs is additional in the sense of gener-
ating new productivity improvements depends thus on the extent to which this investment
expands the portfolio of research activity as opposed to displacing publicly-financed ac-
tivities. If such displacement does take place, then the effect on productivity depends on
decisions taken concerning the reallocation of public breeding investments. In this case, the
productivity benefits might be indirect, being found in the impacts of another crop that
consequently receives higher public breeding investment.
Indirect productivity benefits could also be particularly important in developing
countries. Freed public R&D resources for breeding could be directed to more marginal or
orphan crops, which are generally of greater importance to poorer farmers, or to develop-
ing varieties to more marginal growing conditions, which tend to be inhabited by poorer
farmers. Public agricultural R&D resources could also be redirected to other agricultural
topics, such as irrigation water management, for example. Thus, if support for publicly-
financed agricultural R&D is maintained, then GURTs could allow this total portfolio of
investment to be expanded with associated productivity gains in other sectors. But it is im-
portant to emphasise that realising these benefits for the agricultural sector depends on
continued support for publicly-financed agricultural R&D. This concern is particularly for
developing countries in which a modernising agricultural sector needs to take advantage of
new productivity improvements but an informal sector is even more dependent on produc-
tivity improvements developed with public funds.
In industrialised countries, the benefits from GURTs would be even more likely to be
of an indirect nature. There is currently a long-term trend of decreasing public agricultural
R&D in most OECD countries, or at least decreasing growth in public spending in this area
(Alston et al., 1997). GURTs could be expected to reinforce this trend, providing further
reasons for the public sector to reduce its investment budget while the private sector in-
creases its own. Thus there may not be any overall effect on productivity but public
resources will be freed for other purposes.
Of equal importance would be the even stronger need for developing countries, and
also the international agricultural research centres, to find new mechanisms for accessing
the benefits of research in industrialised countries (Goeschl and Swanson, 2000). In gen-
eral, one of the impacts of GURTs, as with hybridisation, would be to bring agricultural
R&D further into the private realm. To ensure that publicly-funded R&D is able to con-
tinue to address market segments or issues that are not commercially viable, access to
private research results will be necessary. Possible solutions will probably have to involve
public-private partnerships, in which companies can be given incentives (including altruis-
tic ones or fiscal benefits) for making material and technologies available to public
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research institutions for markets that could be considered as unattractive for commercial
interests. Such initiatives would require innovative forms of licensing or technology trans-
fer agreements, with incentives and brokering provided by government agencies in
industrialised countries.
Opportunities for commercial application
The specific crops and markets that would benefit from increased private investment are
difficult to predict although major crops for which hybridisation has not yet been fully suc-
cessful, such as wheat and cotton, are likely candidates. Other considerations that breeders
will probably take into account include:
- market size and growth possibilities;
- current productivity gaps;
- current rates of farm-saved seed;
- development of marketing channels;
- GMO environment: consumer acceptance, segregation and regulatory support possi-
bilities.
The first two of these relate to general investment opportunities for breeders. Market
size tends to be greater in many industrialised countries whereas growth possibilities and
productivity gaps point towards more opportunities in developing country markets. How
these factors interact with the potential for increasing the appropriation of benefits from
farmers, in terms of current rates of farm-saved seed, would probably influence investment
and marketing decisions of breeders. In general, the use of farm-saved seed is highest in
developing countries, but also fairly common in industrialised countries (see table 4.2). A
more serious consideration, at least in the short term, probably relates to consumer accep-
tance of GMOs and (costly) measures to ensure segregation of GMO and non-GMO
products in the food chain, which is discussed further below.
Table 4.2 Farm-saved seed in the EU
Country Farm-saved seed as % of total seed demand
Germany 50
France 50
Italy 70
Netherlands 20-25
Denmark 5
Ireland 20
UK 30
Greece 90
Spain 90
Belgium 35
Source: Rabobank (1996).
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Specific predictions about crop and market combinations to be targeted first for in-
creased investment would require more detailed study. The factors above provide reasons
to support a focus on some industrialised country markets. Others point to possibilities to
address crops in certain more developed markets of the developing world, such as in Asia,
that have not benefited from hybridisation.
Specific considerations in developing countries
To the extent that GURTs do lead to greater investment in agricultural R&D and therefore
greater productivity, there will be benefits not only for farmers and breeders but also for
consumers. In general, GURT-enabled productivity improvements could be expected to
exert downwards pressure on prices for the respective products. Such benefits are poten-
tially quite large, particularly in developing countries, and could be examined further with
specific likely crop-market combinations. It should be emphasised that such benefits are
relatively more important for the urban poor.
While GURTs may lead to an increase in investment for some crops, the nature of
the technology may have a negative effect on the productivity of these breeding efforts
over the longer term by resulting in more separated pools of genetic diversity. At present,
breeders are relatively free to use the products of other breeders in their own research ac-
tivities (breeder's exemption under PVP), although a cost is increasingly becoming
possible with the possibility to patent plant varieties in some countries. V-GURTs could
increase the effect of patenting in making access to germplasm more costly for other
breeders, whether they compete in the same market or not. In the short term, this may be
seen as yet a further strengthening of appropriation and a cost for breeders (figure 3.1). But
in the longer term, the risk is that varieties of agricultural plants or animals will be based
on different pools of restricted genetic diversity with little exchange between them. This
could translate into lower potential productivity in the future than would otherwise be pos-
sible with open use of genepools. Quantification of such a loss is quite difficult and will
certainly take place over a longer time horizon. Potential regulatory issues and responses
are discussed below in section 4.
Concern over an increased productivity lag is most relevant for developing countries.
Many breeding enterprises in developing countries, especially those in the public sector,
regularly use the elite lines developed elsewhere or by multinational firms for the deve l-
opment of varieties for the local market. This is also true of the international agricultural
research centres (IARCs), who more often then not also provide improved lines for na-
tional enterprises. With V-GURTs, but also T-GURTs use of these lines would become
more difficult or costly, leading to a further productivity lag for developing country farm-
ers. Sombilla and Evenson (1999) have demonstrated how reduced flow of improved
genetic material to developing countries as a whole would decrease production relative to
current growth forecasts, leading to an increase in net food imports, as well as an increase
in the number of malnourished children.
Varying rates of diffusion of GURT-embodied productivity gains at an international
level could also lead to shifts in international markets, including the emergence of new
'growth clubs' among developing countries (Goeschl and Swanson, 2000). A lag did occur
with the development and diffusion of high-yielding hybrid crops to developing countries,
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particularly maize and sorghum, providing insight into the possible effects of GURTs. A
simulation study conducted by Goeschl and Swanson (2000) for six widely-cultivated
crops (barley, cotton, millet, rice, soybeans and wheat) at the national level indicates mixed
effects for yield gaps arising from GURTs depending on how far a country lags behind the
genetically potential yields. Developing countries with a better infrastructure for promoting
diffusion of innovations can also be expected, as a whole, to reap the benefits of increased
productivity accompanying V-GURT protection. In other words, despite their lag behind
the technology frontier, the diffusion of new productivity gains would be sufficient to re-
sult in overall productivity gains beyond the current trends. But for countries that have
profited less from hybrid development in the past, the balance could tip the other way.
Without access to a widely-adopted V-GURT technology, such countries could be ex-
pected to lag even further behind current trends in productivity increases, given that V-
GURTs imply fewer technical possibilities for outcrossing of elite varieties to local varie-
ties via informal breeding systems. It must remembered though that this type of analysis
masks stark differences experienced between adopters and non-adopters of new varieties,
especially since the diffuse flow of genetic benefits to varieties used by the latter group
will be further restrained under GURTs than was the case with hybrids.
This diffusion lag works quite slowly. In their analysis, Goeschl and Swanson (2000)
found that significant differences in most developing countries, in terms of positive or
negative deviations from current productivity growth trends, would not emerge on a sig-
nificant scale until after a period of about ten years. The only exception is unfortunately the
slowest laggers, or again the poorest of the developing countries, which would probably
see divergences from the trend almost immediately after the introduction of GURTs. While
there is still an overall positive trend in productivity growth, the sharpened differences
between countries will probably also have effects in global markets, as addressed in the
following section.
The negative productivity impact of a diffusion lag could be increased if developing
country governments chose to restrict availability of GURT technologies. This would have
the effect of further restricting access to the related genetic material. This assumes that this
material is not otherwise available and that measures are not taken to negotiate access to it
by countries not targeted for reasons such as those listed in the previous section (e.g. mar-
ket buying power, institutional support, etc.).
Input markets
The most important effect that can be expected from the introduction of GURTs (espe-
cially V-GURTs as an appropriation mechanism) is an increase in the seed replacement
rate by farmers. This implies the potential to increase the amount of seed purchased i.e. an
effective increase in demand, with a transfer of benefits from farmers to seed suppliers.
The size of this transfer would depend on the existing seed replacement rates, and the rela-
tive prices of seed and crop products, and the rate at which yields deteriorate in replanted
seed 1.
                                                
1 See Heisey and Brennan (1991) for a model of farmers' demand for replacement seed.
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These types of predictions must however be seen as, at the very best, speculative or
even just illustrative. The reason for this is the difficulty in predicting the exact nature and
extent of adjustments in the seed markets to the introduction of GURTs. On the demand
side, farmers cannot be expected to simply increase their purchases of seed by a factor of
two or more, without some extraordinary productivity increase. Farmers in almost all parts
of the world simply do not have the necessary profit margins to accommodate such an in-
crease. The possibility is, as discussed above, that GURTs, as an appropriation mechanism,
will provide the incentive for the private sector to develop such improvements.
If seed suppliers attempt to appropriate more revenue from farmers, then this will
likely have to be through an incremental process that over time allows for adjustments in
other markets, including those for farm products. In fact there is evidence in some places to
suggest that a form of indirect appropriation currently takes place in which seed breeders
demand somewhat higher prices for their seeds (Hansen and Knudsen, 1996). They are of
course aware of the practice of farmer seed re-use. To the extent that this takes place, there
is a rationale for GURTs, aside from bundled productivity increase, to exert a downward
pressure on supplier prices.
From a demand side, GURTs might also have the potential to exert a downward
pressure on farmers' demand. If farmers' factor demand for seed inputs is such that total
expenditures are largely constrained around current levels, then given new restrictions on
the usefulness of purchased seed, it is quite possible that farmer's demand for such seed
will decrease. That is, farmers will only be willing to pay much less for a bag of seed than
previously. Much of this depends on the other options available to the farmer in terms of
other varieties, or in terms of other crops or activities. In the short term, the farmer faces
greater costs in shifting to avoid the purchase of GURT seed. In the long term, these costs
reduce.
Seed suppliers would have to take all these issues into account in their marketing and
pricing strategies for GURT products. It is unrealistic to expect that they will be able, from
one year to the next, to 'extract' massively greater revenues from farmers, in either deve l-
oping or industrialised countries. There are enough alternatives and the downstream
markets for food products are so competitive that such an expectation would not be realis-
tic.
This is not to argue that the effects of GURT introduction, by limiting farmers' op-
tions, would not have serious consequences for some farmers at some places (see
accompanying report on impacts on farming systems). But by examining the sector as a
whole, it becomes more apparent that widespread change is less likely.
GURTs are thus more likely to form part of a longer term strategy of breeders that
allows them to slowly increase the appropriation of benefits from farmers. There is also the
potential to generate longer-term lock-in of farmers. By effectively making use of their
genepool more expensive for competitors with the use of GURTs, seed suppliers may be in
a position to reduce the range of choices available to farmers. This could be in the form of
both reduced seed varieties of similar quality and increased costs in making such a shift.
Whether such lock-in has efficiency considerations could be an area for future investiga-
tions.
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Price Discrimination
Both V-GURTs and T-GURTs may open up possibilities for market segmentation by
breeders and seed suppliers. Such a practice, consisting of essentially the same variety be-
ing sold in different market segments at different prices, could yield efficiency gains and
result in the diffusion of new varieties to segments of the market that previously could not
afford the newest seed technology. One prerequisite for the application of price discrimi-
nation schemes is the existence of barriers to arbitrage trade across different market
segments. The cheaper versions of the seed must be prevented to be re-sold on the high-
end markets at higher prices. 1 Price discrimination with agricultural seeds is already rea-
sonably possible at international level given the relatively low level of trade in agricultural
seed (Rabobank, 1996). Again specific opportunities for such benefits would need to be
identified and assessed. At this point, this motivation does not seem to be a pressing con-
cern for breeders, thus implying that it should not yet be an important policy consideration
for governments. 2
                                                
1 GURTs promise some technical opportunities to prevent resale from developing countries to richer markets.
For example, T-GURT could be induced by conditions related to specific geographical conditions (e.g. day
length).
2 See chapter 1, for a review of current technological developments.
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5. Industry Structure
Vertical integration
Vertical integration and horizontal concentration in the seed breeding and agrochemical
sector has been the subject of much recent attention. GURTs provide possibly a further ra-
tionale for a strengthening of this trend. Whether it provides further concern for the
development of monopoly power in the biotechnology and seed sector depends in part on
the extent to which incumbent firms or new entrants can develop their own GURT or non-
GURT technologies.
Integration to assure supply by reducing risks is a common explanation for past inte-
gration in the seed and agrochemical industries, particularly as these become more
commercialised with market development (Morris, 1998 en King, 2001). Another source of
high transaction costs in biotechnology arises from extensive co-ordination, where deve l-
opment processes at different stages are closely interrelated. Strategies of tying and
bundling have been advanced to understand the behaviour of firms in the glyophosphate
and Roundup-ready soybean markets (Hennessy and Hayes, 2000).
Recent vertical integration in the seed industry can be separated into two waves.
First, multinational companies, mainly active in agricultural chemicals and pharmaceuti-
cals, acquired smaller biotechnology start-ups. These acquisitions were mainly driven by
the perceived commonalties in research technology required to develop new products
(Bijman, 1999). By combining pharmaceutical and agricultural biotechnology research,
these companies perceived they could enjoy economies of scale (The Economist, Nov.
16th, 2000). The mergers and acquisitions involving seed and pharmaceutical and chemical
companies are presented in figure 5.1.
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Parent Co m-
pany
Chemicals Biotech Seed Food/Feed
Monsanto/
Pharmacia
(merged in
2000)
Agracetus (US,
1995)
Calgene (US, 1996)
Ecogen (US, 13%)
Millenium Pharma-
ceuticals (joint
venture)
DeKalb (US, 1996)
Asgrow (US, 1997)
Holdens (US, 1997)
Cargill International
(US, 1998)
Plant Breeding Insti-
tute (UK)
Stoneville (US)
Delta & Pine Land
(strategic alliance)
Cargill Interna-
tional (joint venture
for feed and food)
AgrEvo/
Aventis
(Aventis
thinking
about di-
vesting
Aventis
Crop
Science)
AgrEvo= Hoechst
and Schering
(GER)
Aventis: Rhone-
Poulenc (FR) and
Hoechst (GER)
Plant Genetic Sys-
tems (BE, 1997)
Plant Tec
Nunhems, Sunseeds,
Vanderhave, Pioneer
vegetable genetics,
Cargill US seeds (US,
1998) Limagrain (FR,
alliance)
KWS (20%, GER)
Syngenta
(merger of
Novartis ag-
ribusiness
and Astra-
Zeneca,
2000)
Novartis= Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz
(SWZ, 1996)
AstraZeneca=
Zeneca (UK) and
Astra (UK) (1999)
Mogen Interna-
tional (NL, 1997)
Japan Tobacco
(1999, alliance for
rice)
Northrup King, S&G
Seeds, Ciba seeds,
Roger seeds co., Be-
noist (FR),
Maisadour (FR), Ad-
vanta (merger of
Zeneca seed and Co-
sum, 1995)
Gerber Foods
Dow
Chemicals
Eli Lilly (US, 1997) Mycogen (US,
1996) Ribozyme
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.
Agrigenetics (1992),
United Agriseeds
(1996)
DuPont Alliance with Hu-
man Genome
Science (1996)
Curagen (1997)
Pioneer Hi-Bred
(20% of shares,
bought remaining
shares in 1999)
Hybrinova (UK)
Quality grain (joint
venture with Pio-
neer)
Cereal Innovation
Center (UK)
Empresas la
Moderna/
Seminis
DNA Plant Tech-
nology (1996)
Asgrow (1994, ex-
cept for corn and
soybean, sold to
Monsanto in 1997)
Petoseed (1994),
Royal Sluis Seminis
(62%)
Bionova
Figure 5.1 Overview of Mergers and Acquisitions in the Agro-Biotechnology Industry
Source: Brennan et al. (2000) and information from companies' websites.
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The second wave involved the acquisition of seed companies by the diversified mul-
tinational firms with significant capabilities in discovery and product development
(Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 2000). They realised that revenue generation would be
difficult if based only on technology licenses to seed companies (Falcon, 2000). By verti-
cally integrating, these firms were able to finance their research activities and to deliver
their products to the market (Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 2000). This integration is
relevant not only for industrialised countries: with few exceptions, each of the major com-
panies has a significant presence in the developing world (Byerlee and Fischer, 2000) as
illustrated in figure 5.2.
Parent Co m-
pany
India China S.E. Asia South Af-
rica
Brazil Argentina
Monsanto/
Pharmacia
MAHYCO
(joint-venture
cotton, 26% of
shares)
CASIG
Xinjiang and
Shaanxi
Provincial
Seed Cos.
Hebei Pro-
vincial Seed
Co.
Cargill
Charoen
Pakphand
(joint ven-
ture with
DeKalb)
Cargill
Delta&Pin
eLand
(strategic
alliance)
Calgene
Carnia
(Cargill)
Agroceres
Asgrow
BrasKalb
Monsoy
Cargill
Asgrow
DeKalb
Cargill
AgrEvo/
Aventis
Proagro
Sunseeds
Sunseeds
(joint ven-
ture)
Sunseeds Aventis Aventis
Granja 4
Irmaos
S.A. (rice)
Aventis
Syngenta Novartis
ITC/Zeneca
Advanta Novartis
Advanta
Northrup
King
Advanta?
Northrup
King
Advanta?
Dow Dinamilho
Hibridos
Colorados
Morgan
SA
DuPont Joint-venture
with Southern
Petrochemicals
Pioneer re-
search
subsidiary
Pioneer Pioneer Pioneer Pioneer
Empresas la
Moderna/
Seminis
Petoseeds
(joint ven-
ture with
CASIG)
Petoseeds Petoseeds
Figure 5.2 Overview of Mergers and Acquisitions in Developing Country Seed Industries related to Life
Science Companies
Source: Byerlee and Fischer (2000).
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This wave of vertical integration has thus been driven by the desire to reduce trans-
action costs in accessing and applying biotechnology in integrated product development.
Biotechnology product development frequently involves specific assets, which are tailor
made to one particular seed-chemicals combination. In this case, vertical integration is a
reaction to a hold-up problem, which makes at least one of the transaction partners vulner-
able to moral hazard behaviour of the other partner. High quality germplasm is an
important complementary asset for commercialisation, hence vertical integration into the
seed business and ownership of germplasm are primary strategies of the firms for profiting
from their innovations (Kalaitzandonakes and Bjornson, 1997). The relatively high trans-
action costs of assuring access to germplasm and proprietary biotechnology supports the
integration process (Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 2000). Transaction costs in licensing
and/or resolving patent disputes with respect to biotechnology's provide strong incentives
for mergers and take-overs of companies holding rights to these assets (Lindner, 1999).
Another way in which complementary assets can play an important role fostering integra-
tion and concentration is linked to the development of innovations requiring the use of
proprietary chemical technologies, of particular relevance in the area of T-GURTs (Hay-
enga, 1998). This complementary integration is illustrated in table 5.1 showing seed and
pesticide sales for 1999.
Table 5.1 Top companies in the seed and pesticide industries, 1999
Company Parent Company Seed Sales (million USD) Pesticide Sales
(million USD)
Pioneer Hi-Bred (USA) DuPont 1,850 2,099
Monsanto (USA) Pharmacia 1,700 3,214
Syngenta (SWZ/UK) Novartis+ AstraZeneca 947 6,410
Limagrain (FR) 700
Seminis (USA) SAVIA/Grupo Pulsar 531
Advanta (NL) Cosun and AstraZeneca 416
Sakata (JP) 396
KWS Saat AG (GER) 355
Dow AgroSciences (USA) Dow Chemical 350 2,088
Delta&Pine Land (USA) 301
Aventis CropScience (FR/GER) Aventis 288 4,320
BASF (GER) 3,525
Bayer (GER) 2,316
Makhteshim-Agan (ISR) 720
Source: Bijman (2001).
There has more recently been a trend in the industry for the multinational, diversified
companies to divest their agricultural biotechnology holdings (Bijman, 2001; King, 2001).
Combining pharmaceutical and agricultural research provides economies of scale for basic
research, but these tend to evaporate when it comes to further development and marketing
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(The Economist, Nov. 16th, 2000). 1 Furthermore problems with consumer acceptance of
GMOs in food chains (for example, recent problems with StarLink™ corn) have contrasted
with enthusiasm for applications of biotechnology in pharmaceutical products. Through
divesting biotechnology research, the potential risks of negative public opinion are shifted
from the diversified company to the biotechnology firms. This, compounded with the
lower profit margins in the agricultural sector relative to the pharmaceutical sector, has
contributed to the divestment trend (Bijman, 2001).
GURTs and vertical integration
From the discussion above, it appears that some of the past motives for vertical integration
may be reinforced in the context of GURTs. In particular, the following aspects deserve
attention:
- complementary and specialised assets
This seems to be especially relevant in the case of T-GURTs, where specific chemi-
cals (inducer compounds) function together with the seed per se;
- extensive co-ordination
GURT technology is an 'add-on' to other innovations imbedded in the seed. V-
GURTs protect the imbedded innovation, while T-GURTs enable or disable certain
functions in the seed. Knowledge about this innovative feature is required to effec-
tively utilise their potential. There is therefore the need for close co-operation
between the biotechnology and the chemical (pesticides, fertilisers, trigger com-
pounds) aspects of product development. Such co-ordination can perhaps more easily
be achieved within one vertically integrated organisation;
- strategic entry deterrence
Integration to strategically deter entry by increasing the costs of entry into the indus-
try is also relevant in the case of GURTs. Since T-GURTs produced in an integrated
chemical-seeds industry typically involve combinations of two products that must be
used together. A single-product entrant in the seed industry will only be able to pro-
duce one of those complementary products. The incumbent firms can inhibit
potential entrants by design of the technology, which makes the new entrant's prod-
uct (the genetically modified seed) incompatible, or at least difficult to use, with the
incumbents product (e.g. the inducer). Such strategic behaviour is well known from
the information industry (see Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Whether or not this strategy
might be successful, depends in part on the ability of newcomers to reverse-engineer
existing products.
Economic theory does not provide a clear-cut general answer to the question whether
vertical integration is desirable or not from a societal perspective. Vertical integration may
be beneficial to consumers, for example if double marginalisation is avoided or if the verti-
cally integrated industry provides an improved service, or an improved quality of the
product. Service and quality improvements typically result from better co-ordination
                                                
1 Novartis and AstraZeneca combined their agribusinesses into a single, independent entity in 2000 (Syn-
genta). Aventis announced in November 2000 its intention to sell its agricultural division, while Pharmacia
(that recently bought Monsanto) is expected to sell the agribusiness within two years.
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within the chain and from the elimination of free-rider behaviour. As outlined above, there
may be strong reasons to expect that vertically co-ordinated structures are necessary to
foster the development of GURTs.
Vertical integration may not be welfare improving if the integration process leads to
cartelisation and restricted entry, and at the same time the negative effects of the cartel are
not offset by benefits to buyers. It is an empirical matter requiring assessment on a case-
by-case basis. In empirical cases, one has to establish the social benefits or costs of sup-
plying a given seed product in an integrated structure, relative to the costs of supplying it
via an uncoordinated set of market transactions. Here lies a potential difficulty for assess-
ment of welfare effects: it is possible that the non-integrated development and supply of
the GURT enabled seed may not be observed at all.
Horizontal concentration
Horizontal concentration (fewer suppliers of the same product) in breeding and agricultural
input industries has also been taking place. This concentration can be explained by the in-
creasing economies of scale associated with the application of biotechnology. Thus,
biotechnology start-ups, if successful are increasingly acquired by larger consolidated
companies to acquire access to new proprietary technologies (Kalaitzandonakes and Hay-
enga, 2000). The consequences of such consolidation have affected other related markets:
the agricultural input industry is becoming increasingly concentrated (Brennan et al.,
2000), and so are the innovation markets, as shown in table 5.2 (Hayenga, 1998). In the
US, innovation is becoming concentrated among a small number of large firms, where both
investments and research output are increasing, while new firm entry is declining (Brennan
et al., 2000). Table 5.2 illustrates that during the late '80s and early '90s innovation output
in the US plant biotech industry was highly concentrated among a few firms. Increasing
merger activities are observed in the mid-'90s, a period that also witnessed a mild decline
in concentration as the result of entry of new firms. Comparing the Herfindahl-Hirschman
measure with its lower bound indicates that the new entrants were rather small. 1 It is clear
that research in the US plant biotech industry has been characterised by a high degree of
concentration, which is aggravated over time in spite of entry of some new firms. Brennan
et al. (2000) conclude that the level of research activity of large firms tended to increase
relative to that of small firms. In addition, they assert that the effectiveness of research has
been negatively correlated with size: the larger the (merged) companies become, the
smaller the number of deregulation's per field trial.
Research and development in the seed industry is also concentrating from the point
of view of crops. A few crops are receiving the major share of investments in the industry
(Rangnekar, 2000). Along the same lines, concentration of intellectual property rights is
                                                
1 The four-firm concentration ratio is defined as the sum of market shares of the largest four firms. The Her-
findahl-Hirschman Index is defined as the sum of squared market shares over all firms in the industry:
å
=
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1
2)( . The maximum value of this index equals 1, and it is bounded from below by 1/n, if all
firms have equal market shares. Note that the Brennan et al. (2000) figures used in table 5.2 are based on re-
search output, as measured by the number of field trials, and not on market sales.
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also a preoccupying issue, as a few companies have control over most patents (Brennan et
al., 2000). Such situation tends to erect barriers to the entry of new firms (Lesser, 1998;
Falcon, 2000; Rangnekar, 2000), which in turn reduces the possibilities to increase compe-
tition in the industry.
Table 5.2 Market Concentration in US plant biotech industry
Year Four firm Herfindahl- Herfindahl- Number Number Lower
concentration Hirschman Hirschman of mergers of firms bound
ratio Index Index Herfindahl-
(pre-merger) a) (pre-merger) a) (post-merger) a) Hirschman
index b)
1988 87 0.24 0.24 0 6 0.17
1989 85 0.28 0.28 1 8 0.13
1990 82 0.24 0.24 1 11 0.09
1991 63 0.12 0.12 0 19 0.05
1992 70 0.16 0.16 0 21 0.05
1993 64 0.16 0.16 0 32 0.03
1994 67 0.15 0.15 2 39 0.03
1995 63 0.11 0.13 3 36 0.03
1996 69 0.09 0.13 7 37 0.03
1997 71 0.13 0.19 5 35 0.03
1998 79 0.16 0.22 4 29 0.03
a) Concentration indices calculated on the basis of numbers of field trials (innovation output), rather than on
the basis of sales; b) Author's calculation: lower bound HHI = 1/n, where n denotes the number of firms
Source: Brennan et al., 2000.
The high degree of concentration in research extends into concentrated seed input
markets. Table 5.3 shows market shares and concentration ratios for the three major North
American crops in 1998. With a four-firm concentration in excess of 87% the cotton seed
market is most highly concentrated, followed by corn (67%) and Soybean seed (49%). The
market is not only characterised by the presence of a few players, but also by a very
skewed size distribution, with the largest two firms occupying by far the largest market
share.
GURTs and horizontal concentration
There is therefore the concern that increasing horizontal concentration, which could be
further be enhanced by the application of GURTs. The application of V-GURTs estab-
lishes a monopoly position over the new seed varieties. This monopoly fosters the
appropriability of benefits from innovations, and thus tends to boost R&D activities, which
eventually benefit farmers and consumers. In a similar vein, but possibly less pronounced,
the development of T-GURTs also leads to monopoly positions. In this case, it is the novel
features embedded in the seed that create at least a temporary monopoly in a niche market.
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The potential benefits from increased R&D, fostered by imperfect competition, must
be balanced against potential costs to society. Increasing horizontal concentration may lead
to excessive pricing of inputs for farmers, through tacit or overt collusion among suppliers.
Such an abuse of market power would lead to a redistribution of economic benefits from
consumers to suppliers, who will be able to raise their profits. The ability to actually exer-
cise market power is limited by a number of factors.
Table 5.3 North American seed market shares, 1998
Company Corn Soybean Cotton
Pioneer 39 17 -
Monsanto 15 24 87
- Delta & Pine Land - - 71
- Stoneville - - 16
DeKalb 11 8 -
Asgrow 4 16 -
Novartis 9 5 -
Dow Agrosciences/Mycogen 4 3 -
Golden Harvest 3 - -
AgrEvo/Cargill 4 - -
Hoechst/Schering/Advanta 3 - -
Syine - 4 -
Others private and (public) 20 39 13
(10)
Four firm concentration ratio 67% 49% >87%
Source: Based on Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga (2000).
First, and most obvious, GURT varieties will also have to compete against non-
GURT varieties. The substitution characteristics of demand between more traditional va-
rieties and GURT varieties determine the extent to which suppliers of GURT-enabled
varieties are able to raise prices.
Second, a small number of players alone does not necessarily imply an abuse of mar-
ket power. Tacit or overt collusion is not an easy game to play. A cartel is prone to the
incentive to cheat by individual members, and as a consequence, cartels are seldom stable
over time. In some oligopolistic markets that are characterised by relatively homogeneous
products, the oligopolists may engage in fierce competition, which leads to the same wel-
fare outcome as the perfectly competitive benchmark 1. In addition, even if there are only a
small number of players, there may be a disciplining threat of potential competition by new
entrants to the market. Here, the concept of the market has to be interpreted broadly. The
relevant market is not confined to GURT varieties, but the entire seed market has to be
taken into account. Only if incumbents are able to follow effective entry-deterring strate-
                                                
1 In fact, it needs only two players that compete on price (a Bertrand duopoly) to arrive at this result.
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gies will the threat of potential competition be avoided. Entry deterrence typically involves
raising a newcomer's cost to such levels that entry is not profitable.
Large sunk investments in GURTs R&D, combined with effective knowledge pro-
tection may be such entry-deterring strategies in the GURTs market, but more empirical
research is certainly required before anything firm can be said. 1
An additional entry barrier probably arises from the lock-in of farmers, as outlined
above in the section on input markets. If the acceptance of GURTS leads to an increase of
switching cost to farmers, this can have implications for market structure in the seed in-
dustry. High switching cost tie buyers to the existing suppliers and make entry by
newcomers more difficult (Klemperer, 1987). Another possibility are limit pricing strate-
gies, which an incumbent with scale advantages might play to set prices at such low levels
which make entry for a newcomer unprofitable who has not yet developed scale econo-
mies.
Although the welfare effects of various forms of behaviour in concentrated markets
are rather well understood, it remains to be established which type of competitive (or anti-
competitive) behaviour is actually emerging. Indications of increasing concentrations of
market share (see table 5.2) are themselves not an indication of misuse of monopoly
power. Detailed research is necessary to examine whether excessive pricing is occurring.
Previous research on this issue in seed markets has not yielded any strong evidence
of monopoly pricing. Lesser (1994) examined the prices of soybeans in New York and
found little evidence of monopoly rents attributable to the exclusive privileges associated
with plant breeders rights. As Morris (1998) points out, despite increasing concentration
and integration in maize seed markets in industrialised countries, there has been no strong
evidence to-date of market power translating into higher seed prices. One potential expla-
nation is that diversified input suppliers use seed as a 'loss leader' to secure sales of other
more profitable chemical products.
The potential for GURTs to contribute to this increasing concentration is clear. The
introduction of GURTs would provide further reasons for a strengthening of institutions to
monitor the abuse of market power. Next to monitoring, and possibly regulation, there is
another role for public policy to play, namely public R&D in the seed industry that func-
tions as a (potential) competitor to private R&D. Scale economies in biotechnology R&D
(and marketing) appear to be the overwhelming reason for both vertical and horizontal
concentration. This type of entry barrier makes it very difficult for small private companies
to enter the market. Public R&D that would not be required to recover average cost is one
way to assure some level of competition.
                                                
1 The basic principle is that the incumbent has made huge investments in the past, which the newcomer still
has to incur if he wants to enter. The outlays are sunk from the incumbent's perspective, while the newcomer
can still avoid them, and thus faces different choices than the incumbent who is committed to continue op-
erations in this industry. The combination of economies of scale with irreversible capital commitments may
constitute a barrier to entry (von Weizsäcker, 1980, Kessides, 1990). Another way to prevent entry is to in-
vest in overcapacity which will only be used if entry occurs. Again, the combination of sunk investments and
economies of scale can be used to deter entry (Spence, 1977, Dixit, 1980).
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6. Regulatory issues
In this paper, it has been argued that GURTs offer the potential to increase private sector
investment in agricultural R&D with significant productivity gains. There is a rationale for
promoting the development and application of GURTs, based on the limited review un-
dertaken here, although more in-depth analysis of these potential productivity gains would
better inform such a perspective. This benefit needs to be weighed against the possible
risks associated with GURTs. Based on such an analysis, governments need to decide if
and how they wish to promote the benefits of GURT technology while minimising the
costs associated with the risks. Other chapters and this one have identified a number of
possible rationales for regulation of GURT technology, including:
- consistency with IPR systems including maintaining farmer's privilege under PVP;
- competition policy;
- preventing genepool separation and maintaining availability of genepool for R&D
purposes;
- biosecurity risks arising from contamination through outcrossing of GURT con-
structs or components or effects of inducer compounds.
These issues are discussed below. Those arising primarily from other chapters are
dealt with somewhat more briefly while issues relating to IPR, R&D and competition pol-
icy receive more attention. In each case, the availability to governments of appropriate
regulatory tools is addressed. A more fundamental rationale than those listed above for
regulating the use of GURTs arises from their possible character as GMOs. Some govern-
ments have adopted a policy of prohibiting the cultivation of GMO crops. The basis for
such a rationale, which can involve other arguments, such as ethical concerns, in addition
to biosecurity issues, has not been addressed in this study. If governments have adopted
such a policy, then by logical extension, there is a rationale for also prohibiting the use
GURTs, and presumably no need to compare potential benefits with risks or costs. To pro-
hibit all commercial applications of GURTs, governments can make use of the existing
legislation prohibiting GMOs.
IPR Systems
As has been seen, GURTs offer greater scope for appropriating benefits, through techno-
logical means, than current forms of intellectual property protection, including plant
breeders' rights and patents. GURTs increase the appropriability of benefits in comparison
to plant breeders' rights by extending the scope of protection. The scope of protection cur-
rently offered under plant breeder's rights systems, such as under the UPOV treaties (1978
and 1991), is the result of considerations by policy-makers of the tradeoffs involved in
granting this particular form of IPR for a product and sector of special importance to na-
tional (food security) as well as individual (income and livelihood) interests.
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Governments should proactively respond by deciding whether or not they agree to an
effective circumvention of their IPR legislation as a result of the introduction of GURTs.
The main issue here is that of farmer's privilege. If a government has worked to ensure the
maintenance of this privilege through its approach to PVP and patent legislation, then it
may wish to restrict or even prohibit the use of GURTs as a broader appropriation mecha-
nism. Such a perspective may be particularly relevant for a number of developing countries
that are seeking to do just this in their actions to meet their TRIPS obligations. At the very
least, this new technological development requires a consideration of the various benefits
and costs associated with it.
In developing countries, a major consideration in such an argument may be the rela-
tive inability of GURTs, as compared to legal means, to discriminate between different
types of permitted uses of protected material. Such flexibility allows developing countries,
which have diverse farming systems to moderate the privileges of other breeders and farm-
ers, as can be seen with the farmers privileges. This flexibility does come at the expense of
higher transaction costs and difficulties in enforcement. On the other hand, T-GURTs may
also provide the possibility to distinguish between different types of farmers, such as be-
tween poor farmers in remote areas and industrial farmers supported by a well-developed
market infrastructure.
GURTs should thus provide governments reason to reassess their policies and regu-
lations with respect to agricultural IPR systems. On the one hand, governments may decide
then to adapt existing PVP systems to increase the scope of protection offered to match
GURTs. In addition to extending the scope of protection, it could also be possible to adapt
patent legislation to allow for the use of compulsory licensing as a regulatory means to en-
sure that governments have the legal means to ensure transfer of genetic material to public
institutions (as discussed above) or as a potential means to counter concentration of market
power (discussed in the following section)
Anti-trust and competition laws
This chapter has identified the concentration of market power through vertical integration
or horizontal concentration as one potential impact of GURTs. This provides a rationale for
regulatory measures that would be designed to prevent the misuse of such market power.
About 80 WTO member countries, including 50 developing countries and countries in
transition have adopted some form of anti-trust laws. These laws provide the legal basis to
remedy potentially harmful effects of anti-competitive practices, such as price-fixing, car-
telisation, abuse of dominant market positions, mergers that limit competition, entry
deterring strategies, and vertical arrangements that limit entry by potential competitors.
There are considerable differences between the national anti-trust laws, but certain ele-
ments are common. Typically, anti-trust laws do not declare monopolies illegal per se, but
are designed to correct for inefficiencies that may be the result of monopolisation and car-
telisation. Anti-trust laws do, however, typically provide for measures to prevent the
acquisition of monopoly power, for example through mergers. Most anti-trust cases are
concerned with the question whether a firm has market power, that is, the ability to set
prices profitably above competitive levels, and further whether the firm abuses its market
power. In practice, it is often difficult to ascertain whether a firm has indeed market power,
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and usually market share is used as an indirect indicator of market power. In order to make
sense, the measurement of market shares must properly define the 'relevant' market. The
relevant market may be limited to seed of only one crop, or extended to numerous crops if
the latter comprises the choices facing farmers. The market may also include agrochemical
inputs in addition to seeds where the choice of a given seed implies also a given chemical
choice, given product tying due to technical requirements or simply due to distribution and
marketing arrangements. Once a relevant market has been defined, a number of indicators
based on market shares can be constructed, such as in tables 5.2 and 5.3.
It is evident that the institutionalisation of policies towards the regulation of anti-
competitive behaviour is an important step towards the promotion of an efficient function-
ing of markets. Such regulatory frameworks can be applied to address potential problems,
such as excessive pricing, vertical foreclosure, bundling and exclusive dealing, that could
arise with GURTs. However, consumers and farmers in countries with weaker institutions
and little resources to develop such institutions are more prone to such potentially harmful
effects from GURTs in the seed industry. An important question is whether international
agencies and international agreements can step in to fill this gap.
Typically national anti-trust laws and regulations are concerned with effects on na-
tional markets. 1 Consequently, the authority of anti-trust agencies ends at the border.
Interest in interaction between trade and competition policy is only recently developing. At
one level, more openness to international trade implies more competition on domestic
markets, and will consequently limit domestic firm's ability to exercise market power.
However, this argument may need to be reconsidered as more supply chains are multina-
tional enterprises, which serve a multitude of national markets. A multinational will not
compete with itself, and in so far as the concentration in the seed industry is a global phe-
nomenon, the 'relevant market' may be global rather than national.
At the Singapore Ministerial in 1996, the WTO set up a working group on Trade and
Competition Policy (WGTCP). This work has concentrated on stocktaking of existing in-
struments and defining the scope of an international co-operation in this area 2. The Doha
Ministerial Declaration in November 2001 announced the further institutionalisation of
work on the interaction between trade and competition policies.
Biosecurity
Biosecurity concerns were discussed in chapter 2. There is a rationale for regulating the
use of T-GURT or V-GURT constructs or their components to minimise the risks due to
contamination of other crops or wild relatives. Furthermore, there is a rationale for regu-
lating the introduction of inducer compounds to minimise risks on people and the
                                                
1 The European Union's competition laws are perhaps an exception (Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome
and the European Commission Merger Regulation). Here, anti-competitive behaviour is subject to scrutiny of
Brussels if such behaviour has a communitarian effect i.e. the market here is seen to go beyond the national
boundaries and extends to the European Common market. Similar attempts are being made in the
MERCOSUR custom's union of South America.
2 There is currently one known case in the feed industry, where a cartelisation issue in the lysine (a protein
used in animal feed) market was brought to attention under the WTO safeguard process and subsequently
lead to prosecution in the USA under USA anti-trust laws (OECD, 2001).
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environment. Based on information available at this point, it is not possible to say that
these concerns imply a justification for prohibiting the commercial applications of GURTs.
It seems more likely that there is a rationale for ensuring that steps are taken to minimise
these risks, although this judgement depends on the size of the potential risks involved,
about which little is known.
In the case of inducer compounds, governments can probably make use of the legis-
lative framework governing the use of pesticides and veterinary medicines as a basic tool
of regulation although legislation would require modification. In the case of regulating the
use of GURTs to minimise risks to the environment, governments are likely to be faced
with a lack of available legislative tools. The main precedent might be existing legislation
on the use of GMO varieties. More importantly, it is not clear how governments can assess
the risks of contamination nor what forms of appropriate measures would be desired. This
is an area requiring urgent work so that governments wishing to promote the use of
GURTs for their benefits have well-founded regulation systems for minimising biosecurity
risks.
Maintaining availability of genepools
The potential risk of genepool separation has been discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. It has
been argued that there is a risk that GURT-protected varieties could enhance the trend of
separation based on the increased application of patent laws in the breeding sector. The ra-
tionale for regulation concerns maintaining the availability of new material primarily for
national and international public agricultural research programmes in developing countries.
The likely risk in industrialised countries would probably be less given the possibility that
companies in the private sector have the option of negotiating licenses among each other to
access material whereas public sector organisations in developing countries would be fi-
nancially more constrained. But it is here also difficult to assess the potential size of this
risk.
On the other hand, the tools for dealing with this issue could be provided by the leg-
islative framework of the patent laws. It seems very likely that patent protection will be
sought for GURT applications, given that the economic rationale for GURT development
is as an appropriation mechanism. Current applications for patents for GURT technologies
seem to confirm such a hypothesis. Compulsory licensing provisions could be incorporated
into patent legislation to provide governments with the means to ensure the public avail-
ability of GURT-free variants of GURT protected varieties. To not remove the incentives
for the private sector in GURT development, such provisions would have to incorporate
considerations such as an appropriate embargo or waiting period, as well as provisions
concerning the use of such material. This possibility requires that countries have function-
ing patent systems for plants or biotechnological products. It also implies that countries
need to maintain public research programmes for such purposes.
Other Regulatory and Policy Measures
If a government decides that it is willing to permit the increased scope of protection under
GURTs and to support their implementation, then a number of other regulatory/policy is-
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sues are important. These include in the first instance, whether other forms of accompany-
ing regulatory support are potentially warranted.
Information provision to farmers is an accompanying policy issue of particular im-
portance for developing countries. In areas where information flow in rural areas is not
very efficient and where farmers have few options for verifying information received con-
cerning products in the market, there is a great risk of misinformation concerning available
varieties, particularly of agricultural seed. Farmers may, on the one hand, suspect all avail-
able modern varieties as containing GURTs. On the other hand, farmers may unknowingly
purchase GURT-enabled varieties, or may simply not have any means for verifying the
authenticity of claims made by local traders. The potential impacts on livelihoods of such
misunderstandings are quite large. Governments would have to look for ways to further
reinforce the market infrastructure so as to improve the availability of information for
farmers. Unfortunately, the potential for errors and their consequences are greatest in re-
moter areas where the challenges of providing such market infrastructure are greatest.
Complementary public investment is another possible accompanying measure to
GURT introduction, and has already been alluded to above. In developing countries, this
could be useful for addressing the needs of farmers not addressed by the new technology.
The tools to do so, public agricultural research programmes, exist although they have been
neglected recently in some countries due, for example, to fiscal pressures. As argued in
section 2, GURTs could actually allow a refocusing of public agricultural R&D funds, by
increasing the amount of private sector investment. Another possibility is to use public
sector R&D to maintain some sort of competition for GURT based lines, perhaps only at
pre-breeding stages. This could provide farmers with a non-GURT choice among elite
lines, and thus ensure a certain amount of competition.
Yet another supportive measure concerns regulations that restrict those other than the
right holder from selling a variety is compulsory removal from certified variety lists. In
most countries, apart from PVP, legislation also exists requiring commercialised varieties
to be approved and certified for sale, primarily from the perspective of quality control and
consumer (in this case, farmers) protection. Such legislative frameworks can be designed
in such a way that varieties must be removed from the list, after a certain time period, or at
the request of the breeder. This further extends any patent protection offered on a GURT
technology itself. Whether this is desirable from a policy perspective depends again, as
with IPR in general, on the balance sought between innovation incentives and monopoly
powers.
Measures to prohibit or restrict GURTs
On the other hand, very few viable options are available for restricting or prohibiting the
use of GURTs if governments wish to deny this increased appropriability. Biosafety legis-
lation's cannot be easily used to prohibit the introduction of GURTs, because most GURTs
themselves do not pose a specific threat to food or environmental safety. Using biosafety
laws to ban GURTs from the market would be liable to complaints in the WTO.
IPR systems are based on either novelty, non-obviousness and industrial application
(patents) or distinctness, uniformity and stability (PBR). New GURT based varieties are
likely to be eligible for protection in those countries that offer patents and/or plant
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breeder's rights. There are no existing grounds for disapproval of GURT as a technology or
a variety containing GURT. Such grounds would have to be added to the IPR legislation,
possibly by appeal to the 'ordre publique' clause of TRIPS, but this would probably be the
subject of a dispute under TRIPS.
Some types of seed legislation may, however, offer an opportunity. Variety release
procedures are often liable to registration procedures and performance testing. Since re-
quirements for registration are strongly linked with those for breeder's rights, there are no
reasons to disapprove a GURT based variety. Where variety release also includes compul-
sory performance testing, it is possible to disapprove V-GURT varieties, on the basis of not
producing a viable second generation. Prohibiting T-GURTs will not likely be possible
through seed legislation because conventional hybrids lose part of their value when multi-
plied. This option requires having a system of compulsory performance testing as part of a
restrictive variety release system. Many countries have however dispensed with this type
of seed legislation or maintained it only for certain crops.
Yet another option might be the use of trade restrictions to prevent the import of
GURT-enabled products, although this could possibly become the subject of a trade dis-
pute founded on technical barriers to trade. Trade restrictions also do not prevent a
producer from setting up production facilities within a country.
Summary
As stated at the outset of this section, sufficient information is not yet available to provide
governments with a clear answer to whether prohibition, restriction or promotion of
GURTs is desirable on economic welfare grounds. A cautious interpretation of the argu-
ments presented here and in other chapters indicates that the potential benefits offered by
GURTs in comparison to their costs and risks are probably worth examining in more de-
tail. Outright prohibition does not seem to be overwhelmingly justified at this stage and is
probably quite difficult from a legal point of view, although the possibilities might only be
known through a process of WTO dispute resolution. On the other hand, there is scope for
further examining the possibilities of promoting the benefits of GURTs while developing
appropriate regulatory measures to minimise the costs and risks. Such an examination, by
revealing new information, should support more detailed assessments of the economic im-
pacts of GURTs.
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7. Conclusions
GURTs provide an interesting example of the various policy issues presented by transgenic
agricultural biotechnology. The technology may lead to productivity benefits and greater
consumer choice by attracting increased private investment to particular crops. But its pri-
mary purpose is to increase the ability of such breeders to appropriate the benefits of their
research investments. The benefits to the agricultural sector are expected only as a possible
result from achieving this primary purpose. With GURTs, biotechnology could thus poten-
tially strengthen the extent and effectiveness of IPR systems without any legislative
component.
One obvious victim of such development could be seed and farming systems in de-
veloping countries that rely on largely public breeding programs and the exchange and re-
use of seed, among both breeders and farmers. GURTs could restrict the flow of elite mate-
rial to these sectors, a flow that has contributed to the more meagre achievements in
productivity growth for more marginalised countries and farming systems. More seriously,
GURTs could go even further and provide the means for corporations to abuse their re-
sulting market power. The agrochemical and seed sector is becoming increasingly
consolidated both horizontally and vertically. More effective technological restrictions on
the use of genetic material could possibly reduce competitive forces, implying a need for
regulatory scrutiny.
As a transgenic technology, GURTs are susceptible to the same consumer acceptance
problems as other genetically modified crops. Ironically, GURTs may also provide part of
a solution to biosecurity concerns relating to genetic contamination, which is one aspect of
consumer reluctance to accept transgenic technology in foodstuffs. But, at the same time,
there are fears that genetic leaks could pose serious threats to the food security of farming
systems relying on informal seed systems that then become contaminated with GURT ste-
rility.
For all these reasons, GURTs pose a number of important policy issues. This report
has reviewed these issues from an economic perspective, while recognising that ethical and
biosecurity issues also need to play a major role in an integrated assessment of the poten-
tial impacts of GURTs.
Weighing up the various potential costs and benefits associated with GURT deve l-
opment poses a challenging task for governments. As this review has pointed out, much of
the necessary information is not available. Furthermore, the balance between costs and
benefits may differ from crop to crop, favouring a flexible approach to policy making.
The most important policy decision facing governments, particularly with respect to
V-GURTs, is whether any inherent extension by technological means of existing IPR re-
gimes is now desirable. In other words, would governments also be willing to revise their
plant varietal protection (PVP) legislation to offer the same degree of protection? Pre-
sumably such a desire implies an evaluation of the existing legislation with the conclusion
that the scope of protection should be broadened. An important factor in such a decision
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must be the evaluation of the effect of PVP on investment incentives with the conclusion
that even more productive investment in certain breeding activities is desirable and can be
achieved through more stringent protection measures.
Some governments have made such a decision already by offering patent protection
to agricultural crops, or their components. Others may need to examine the past impacts of
their PVP systems in order to assess this decision. Still others, in particular many develop-
ing countries, are only currently implementing PVP, as part of their obligations under the
TRIPS agreement. Some of these countries, in designing relatively weak sui generis sys-
tems, would presumably be against GURTs. Others, that may for example have opted for
adhesion to the UPOV Convention, may presumably have a more nuanced view.
As this report has pointed out, there may actually be very limited means for prohib-
iting or restricting the development and application of GURTs. The most appropriate
manner appears to be through seed certification legislation, as opposed to through biosecu-
rity/biosafety legislation. If governments decide to allow, or perhaps even support, GURT
development and application, a number of other policy issues still deserve attention, stem-
ming from the review of the various impacts. Leaving aside biosafety/biosecurity which
has not been the subject of this report, the first of these issues concerns the priorities for
public agricultural research. Governments should re-examine these, based on knowledge as
to where GURT investment is concentrating. In some cases, it may be possible for public
funds to be shifted towards other priorities that are neglected by commercial breeding ac-
tivities, such as poorer farmers' crops in the case of developing countries. By maintaining
and shifting public research funds, it is possible to gain the additional investment benefit
from GURTs. On the other hand, it may be desirable in some circumstances to adjust pub-
lic research so that it continues to provide or support a source of competition in given
sectors targeted by GURTs. Making such decisions requires a good understanding of the
importance of germplasm flows in the breeding sector between various actors in the public
and private sector.
Anti-trust and competition policy is another issue that will deserve attention with
GURT development. Governments will want to ensure that they have sufficient legislative
frameworks and regulatory capacity to ensure that any abuses of market power resulting
from GURT application can be investigated with the threat of effective penalties. For de-
veloping countries, capacity in this area is a particular concern. Given the multinational
character of many agrochemical and seed corporations, the need for international competi-
tion frameworks would also become stronger, probably with the context of the WTO.
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